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Historical Approach to the Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity*
George W. Pughf
Generations have genuflected before the divine altar of
sovereign immunity, and as a result, countless litigants have been
stunned by the rigorous application of the dead but lethal
residuum of an outmoded doctrine.' "The king can do no wrong"
is a maxim familiar to layman and lawyer alike. Legal historians
have struck at the very bases of this unwanted and unjust con-
cept,2 and legislatures have gradually relinquished the state's
claim to irresponsibility.
Much has been done in recent years towards the effective
elimination of the bar of sovereign immunity. Numerous con-
gressional acts now permit relief in specific and ever-widening
areas of litigation, and the Federal Tort Claims Act of 19 463 is a
high point in the fight for responsible government. Nevertheless,
much remains to be done. This is abundantly clear in the field
of procedural law, for here the technical tangles of procedural
''niceties" remain to perplex and confound the citizen seeking
justice from his government. The hodge-podge sporadic renun-
ciation of governmental immunity has resulted in much injustice,
* The substance of this article was submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for an advanced degree in law at Yale Law School.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Faculty Editor,,
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1. Even where the Constitution itself prohibited certain acts by the
government against its citizens, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has at
times intervened to prevent actual protection. Although the Fifth Amend-
ment provides that no "private property" shall "be taken for public use
without just compensation," it was not until the Court of Claims was estab-
lished In 1855 (Act of Feb. 24, 1855, c. 122, 10 Stat. 612) that effective legal
procedures were established to put teeth into the constitutional prohibition.
See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 28 (1924).
2. Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time
of Edward I, 515-518 (2 ed. 1899); Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant 1-13,
192-207 (1927); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1
(1926).
3. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, c. 753, 60 Stat. 843, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1948).
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and the attorney preparing to sue his government is faced with
a maze of procedural problems. This article will analyze the
historical basis for the use of the doctrine by federal courts.4
Obscurity and uncertainty must characterize any discussion
of the historical bases of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.5
Legal historians now deprecate any attempt to enshroud the
doctrine with the aura of Roman antiquity,6 and it is to early
England that one must look for historical "clarification." Opinions
differ as to the exact origins of the concept. It is known that the
petition of right developed during the reign of Edward I, and it
has been argued that prior to the reign of Edward I, the king
was subject to suit in his own courts,7 but in their authoritative
work on early England, Pollock and Maitland state as a simple
fact that even at that time, the king was free from suit and prose-
cution in his own courts.8 These authorities hasten to point out,
4. For more generalized discussions of the doctrine of sovereign Immu-
nity, see: Robinson, Public Authorities and Legal Liability (1925); Watkins,
op. cit. supra note 2; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1,
129 (1924), 229 (1925); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale
L.3. 1 (1926), 757, 1039 (1927).
5. This obscurity has even characterized the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court In this field. As was pointed out by Mr. Borchard, Govern-
ment Liability In Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1 (1924): "When Justice Miller of the
United States Supreme Court remarked In" Gibbons v. United States [75 U.S.
269, 276 (1868)] that 'no government has ever held Itself liable to Individuals
for the misfeasance, laches or unauthorized exercise of power by its officers
or agents,' his horizon was extremely limited, for he overlooked the fact that
practically every country of western Europe has long admitted such liability."
6. "There is reason to doubt, however, if a contemporary interpretation
of Roman law would have justified the conclusion that even in legal theory
the head of the state was exempt from legal responsibility; there is still
stronger evidence to show that even if such a position were held by the
head of the Roman state, the principles of law on which this position was
founded received a different interpretation in England, when the position of
the king is considered." Watkins, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1.
7. See Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 Va. L. Rev. 349, 352 (1925),
in which an able discussion of the conflicting views is given.
See also the excellent discussion found in Watkins, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 4-12, in which the author points out that Bracton said that the king was
himself subject to the law, but stated that there was no remedy against the
king, except by petition, unless "gross violations" of the law were committed,
in which case the people need not wait for the ultimate judgment of God,
but might themselves have judgment upon him, and might take action in the
"court of the king himself."
In the famous case, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 459 (1793), discussed
infra, p. 483, Justice Wilson stated as a fact that prior to the time of Edward I,
the king could be sued as a matter of right in his own courts.
8. Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 2, at 515-518. It is here sug-
gested that if Henry III had been capable of being sued "he would have
passed his life as defendant."
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however, that this was in no way due to a feeling that the king
was above the law, for ample authority sustains the proposition
that the converse was the prevailing attitudeY The king could
not "be compelled to answer in his court, but this is true of every
petty lord of every petty manor; that there happens to be in this
world no court above his is, we may say, an accident."' 0 Thus the
king's immunity was personal to himself, and arose from the
practical needs and peculiarities of the feudal system, rather
than from any conception that the king is superior to the law.
It is not clear at exactly what point the personal immunity
of the king was transformed into its present day counterpart-the
immunity of the Crown. It seems, however, that this change was
accomplished during the rise of the nation state.1' Thus what was
once the mere personal immunity of an individual was finally
merged with the whole concept of sovereignty; and the theory
of the divine right of kings lent support to the proposition that
the king was above the law-that he was in fact the law-giver
appointed by God, and therefore could not be subjected to the
9. In Bracton there is a blending of the two views of the king's position.
Ile is deemed to be beneath the law, but from the standpoint of the theo-
logian, he is deemed the Vicar of God and therefore not subject to the control
of man. Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort:
A Comparative Study, 9 Law and Contemp. Prob. 181, 182 (1942).
In The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 Va. L. Rev. 349, 352 (1925), Barry
points to the following statement which appeared In the Year Book during
the reign of Henry VI:
"La ley est le plus haut Inheritance que le roy ad; car par la ley 11
mem, et touts ses sujets sont rules, et si la ley ne fuit, nul Rol, ny nul
inheritance sera."
10. Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 2, at 515.
11. "How then, from the position of personal exemption, was the Idea of
state exemption derived? The following Is offered as a reasonable hypothesis.
With the downfall of the feudal system and the growth of the idea of the
modern state, the old restraints upon the king vanished. The king himself
became the state. The king retained the powers he had held before by virtue
of his position at the apex of the feudal pyramid; he then became the head
of the Church also, and combined Divine attributes with temporal authority.
At about this time doctrines of sovereignty appeared. Bodin, generalizing
from the facts of his day, offered an explanation of existing facts In scientific
form. He made the 'Sovereignty of the ruler the essence of the State.' 'The
personality of the corporate body is concentrated in and absorbed by the
personality of its monarchical head,' after which 'we are plunged Into talk
about kings who do not die, who are never under age, who are ubiquitous,
who do no wrong, and (says Blackstone) think no wrong; and such talk has
not been Innocuous.'" Watkins, op. cit. supra note 2, at 11.
See also Laski, Responsibility of the State In England, 32 Harv. L. Rev.
447 (1919).
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indignity of suit by his subjects. 12 To Bracton the maxim "the
king can do no wrong" meant simply that the king was not
privileged to do wrong,13 but to Blackstone the phrase was not
so restricted, and in his Commentaries the following is to be
found: 14
"Besides the attribute of sovereignty, the law also
ascribes to the king in his political capacity absolute per-
fection. The king can do no wrong: ...
"The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing
wrong, but even of thinking wrong: he can never mean to
do an improper thing: in him is no folly or weakness."
Thus the doctrine developed, humble in its origins, but lethal
in its final implications. Fortunately, however, the rigors of the
doctrine were tempered by the genius of the English homus
politicus, and gradually increasing relief was granted by the
development of procedures for suits against the Crown.15 The
petition of right is by far the most famous of such procedures,
and dates back to the reign of Edward 1.16 Unfortunately, how-
ever, the petition of right did not extend to the field of torts, and
in this area the wronged citizen had to rely upon the ingenuity
of the English legal mind. As the concept of governmental func-
tion expanded, English courts permitted suit against the govern-
ment official or employee who had actually committed the wrong
12. "Bodin (1576) and Hobbes (1651) with Machiavelli (1513) are probably
the fathers, though not without some earlier philosophical authority, of the
modern notion that the sovereign (king) is above the law, that sovereignty
is 'the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth,' that the sovereignty
is the 'supreme power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by the laws,'
that the chief function of sovereignty was the creation of law and that as the
creator of law, the sovereign was not bound by the law. Bodin did not con-
ceive the State itself as sovereign, but only one element in it, the king. Law
is the 'command of a sovereign using his sovereign power.'" Borchard, Gov-
ernmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 757, 785 (1927).
13. See discussion in Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36
Yale L.J. 1, 22 (1926).
14. 1 B. Comm. 246.
15. See generally, Watkins, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1-49.
16. For a discussion of the petition of right see Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1, 23 (1926); Watkins, op. cit. supra note
2, at 16-31.
In United States v. O'Keefe, 78 U.S. 178 (1870), the Supreme Court was
presented with the following question: Does a United States citizen have
the right to sue the Crown in the courts of Great Britain to recover proceeds
of captured or abandoned property? Unless the answer to this question was
in the affirmative, a British subject could not under the statute maintain a
similar action against the United States in the Court of Claims. The court
found that in such cases the petition of right was granted as a matter of
routine, and refused only in extraordinary situations, and that therefore
within the meaning of the statute, there was the right to maintain the action.
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complained of. Since in theory the king could do no wrong, it
would be impossible for him to authorize a wrongful act, and
therefore any wrongful command issued by him was to be con-
sidered as non-existent, and provided no defense for the dutiful
subject.' 7
Even in England, however, the picture has by now com-
pletely altered, for by the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947,18 the
subject has been given the right to institute civil proceedings
against the Crown, and this is true in tort as well as contract. 19
Rules as to master-servant liability are now generally applicable
to the Crown,20 and proceedings against his Majesty by way of
petition of right and monstrans de droit were abolished.21 Sev-
eral books are to be found which give a detailed appraisal of the
various provisions of the statute,22 and it is not within the pur-
view of this article to offer such an analysis. But it is important
to note that the English themselves have abandoned their tradi-
tional system 23 and have attempted to formulate an integrated
statute which will be more in keeping with the needs of modern
society. A similar re-appraisal is undoubtedly necessary in our
own country.
Since the days of the Declaration of Independence, the
keystone of American political thought has been responsible
government, and the entire history of the American Revolution
would seem to negate the applicability in this country of the
English maxim that the king can do no wrong. Such has been
in fact the holding of the United States Supreme Court,24 but
the threads of English precedent are nevertheless visible in
American decisions. Despite the absence of historical and philo-
17. For a discussion of liability of officers in England see Watkins, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 39-49.
The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply. Morgan, Introduc-
tory Chapter on Remedies Against the Crown, in Robinson, Public Authori-
ties and Legal Liability xii et seq. (1925).
18. 10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 44.
19. Bridges, The Crown Proceedings Act, 67 Law Notes 18 (1948).
20. Smith, Bickford, The Crown Proceedings Act, 67 Law Notes 18 (1948).
21. Id. at 25.
22. Bell, Crown Proceedings (1948); Smith, Bickford, The Crown Pro-
ceedings Act (1947, 1948); Williams, Crown Proceedings (1948). See also
Statutes of the Realm, 66 Law Notes 241 (1947); Bridges, The Crown Pro-
ceedings Act, 67 Law Notes 18 (1948); Chapman, Book Review, 66 L.Q. Rev.
540 (1950).
23. In his book review, Mr. Chapman commented that "The passing of
the old system will not, itself, elicit a tear from anyone. 66 L.Q. Rev.
540, 541 (1950).
24. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879). See discussion of this
case, infra p. 489.
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sophical justification, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is today
a part of American legal dogma. Common sense alone would
indicate that the adoption of such a theory in a democratic state
must of necessity give rise to much confusion and unjustified
rationalization, and. this brief historical survey will illustrate the
validity of this common sense forecast. The adoption of the
doctrine in this country is to be explained by the thought habits
of common law lawyers, and by the very natural desires of
state governments to avoid payment of their vast debts.
Blackstone and Coke were read and reread by the American
lawyer, and the Revolution did not sever the tie of the colonists
with the common law. 25 Even during the Revolution itself, a
Pennsylvania admiralty court denied jurisdiction in a libel action
against a ship of war.2
6
When the Constitutional fathers met in Philadelphia, they
quite naturally brought with them their predilections for the
concepts of the common law. Of course there was no necessity
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity be carried over into
the law of the United States, and indeed consistency and logic
would seem to have demanded its elimination. The Constitution
is not clear on the question of suits against the government, but
a literal interpretation of Article III would seem to permit such
suits.2 7
The states owed huge debts, contracted in the prosecution of
the war, and were much concerned that federal courts might
force the payment of these obligations. 28 The phrase in Article
III, Section 2, that the "judicial Power shall extend ... to Contro-
versies ... between a State and Citizens of another State" was
for this reason the center of much heated discussion, but such men
as Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall assured the states that this
in no way meant that a state should be subject to suit at the hands
of a citizen. Their reasoning appears forced and illogical, but was
apparently what the states wanted to hear. In The Federalist
Hamilton took pains to allay the fears of the states:
25. The first edition of Blackstone was published during the period 1765-
1769, and an American reprint appeared in Philadelphia in 1771. Burke is
said to have remarked in a speech in 1775 that nearly as many Commentaries
had been sold in America as in England. It was estimated that nearly 2,500
copies had been sold in the colonies by the time of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. See the discussion of the effect of Blackstone on colonial thought,
Barker, Essays on Government 127 et seq. (1945).
26. Pierre de Moitez v. The South Carolina, Bee 422 (1781).'
27. See Watkins, op. cit. supra note 2, at 52.
28. Ibid.
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"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.
This is the general sense, and the general practice of man-
kind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sov-
ereignty, is now enjoyed by the Government of every State
in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the Convention, it will remain with
the States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.
. . . there is no color to pretend that the State Govern-
ments would by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the
privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free
from every constraint but that which flows from the obliga-
tions of good faith. The contracts between a nation and
individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sov-
ereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They
confer no right of action, independent of the sovereign will.
To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States
for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced?
It is evident, it could not be done, without waging war
against the contracting State: and to ascribe to the Federal
Courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a pre-
existing right of the State Governments, a power which
would involve such a consequence, would be altogether
forced and unwarrantable. ' '29
In their arguments for the ratification of the Constitution by
Virginia, Madison and Marshall gave similar interpretations of
the famous clause in Article III. Madison argued:
"Its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and
citizens of another state is much objected to, and perhaps
without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call
any state into court. The only operation it can have, is that,
if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it
must be brought before the federal court. This will give
satisfaction to individuals, as it will prevent citizens, on whom
a state may have a claim, being dissatisfied with the state
courts. It is a case which cannot often happen, and if it
should be found improper, it will be altered. But it may be
attended with good effects.
"... It appears to me that this can have no operatior
but this-to give a citizen a right to be heard in the federal
29. The Federalist, No. 81, at 567 (Dawson ed. 1873).
[VOL. XIII
1953] DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 483
courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, this
court may take cognizance of it." 0
In a like vein Marshall expressed views later reiterated from the
bench,31 now endowed with the force of judicial precedent:
"With respect to disputes between a state and the citi-
zens of another state, its jurisdiction has been decried with
unusual vehemence. I hope that no gentleman will think
that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court. Is
there no such case at present? Are there not many cases in
which the legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the
state is not sued? It is not rational to suppose that the sov-
ereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent
is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing
in other states. I contend this construction is warranted by
the words. But, say they, there will be partiality in it if a
state cannot be defendant-if an individual cannot proceed
to obtain judgment against a state, though he may be sued
by a state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided.
I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does not
prevent its being plaintiff. If this be only what cannot be
avoided, why object to the system on that account? If an
individual has a just claim against any particular state, is it to
be presumed that, on application to its legislature, he will not
obtain satisfaction? But how could a state recover any claim
from a citizen of another state, without the establishment of
these tribunals?"
3 2
Although the confident interpretations of Hamilton, Madison
and Marshall may have coincided with what the states wanted
to hear, their views were very early rejected by the Supreme
Court, for in 1793 the famous case of Chisholm v. Georgia33 held
that the citizen of one state had the right to sue another state in
assumpsit. Each of the justices rendered a separate opinion, but
only one dissented from the holding of the court.
Mr. Justice Wilson's opinion is by far the most interesting,
and presents an eloquent and persuasive denunciation of govern-
mental immunity and the whole concept of sovereignty. He takes
the position that the only place in the Constitution where the
30. 3 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 533.
31. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821); United States v. Clarke, 33
U.S. 436 (1834).
32. 3 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 555-556.
33. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
word sovereignty might properly have been used is with respect
to the people of the United States and notes that even then the
"ostentatious declaration" was omitted. He does not specifically
state his views as to whether or not the United States might also
be sued, but certainly the whole tenor of his opinion would lead
to that conclusion. Mr. Justice Blair denied the relevance of
European structures, for he pointed out that the likeness that
existed was not sufficiently great to justify analogical applica-
tion, and that they are "completely destitute of any binding
authority here." Both Mr. Justice Cushing and Mr. Chief Justice
Jay raised the question of the right of a citizen to maintain a suit
against the United States itself, but neither attempted to answer
the quaere, although each recognized, in passing, that from a
legal standpoint a distinction might be drawn between the two
situations. The Chief Justice, however, made it abundantly clear
that he felt it desirable that governments be made responsible
before courts in such matters:
"I wish the state of society was so far improved, and the
science of government advanced to such a degree of perfec-
tion, as that the whole nation could, in the peaceable course
of law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual
citizens. Whether that is, oris not, now the case, ought not to
be thus collaterally and incidentally decided: I leave it a
question. '3 4
It is to be lamented that even after a hundred and fifty years,
the hopes of men like Jay have not been fully realized.
35
Only one justice dissented from the decision of Chisholm v.
Georgia. Mr. Justice Iredell gave a scholarly commentary on
English practice, and detailed the development of the doctrine
in England discussing the writs available to English subjects. In
a purely historical critique, buttressed by congressional failure
to indicate a change in the common law of England, he opined
that the State of Georgia had an immunity similar to that of the
English crown.
As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in subsequent
decisions3 6 (in which the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
been recognized), the analogy to English practice is totally
34. Id. at 478.
35. See the very critical opinion of Judge Frank in Hammond-Knowlton
v. United States, 121 F. 2d 192 (2d cir. 1941).
36. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879); United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196 (1882). Cf. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
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unwarranted. The maxim that the king can do no wrong has
been squarely rejected by our highest court.3 7 We have no king,
and there is none in the executive department (as in England)
with authority to waive the application of the doctrine. Our
basic governmental philosophy is totally opposed to that which
would logically give rise to such undemocratic dogma. There is
nothing in the Constitution which compels such a result, and
much therein which would indicate the opposite conclusion. If
there be a justification for governmental immunity in this coun-
try, it is not to be found in English precedent. Mr. Justice Iredell's
dissent, based as it is on the historic immunity of the British
crown, is completely inimical to the modus vivendi of the growth
and development of American political philosophy.38
The impact of the decision of Chisholm v. Georgia was imme-
diate. The states owed vast debts as a result of the cost of prose-
cuting the Revolution, and they were much concerned that
federal judgments might force the immediate payment of these
obligations. The Eleventh Amendment was immediately pro-
posed and ratified.3 9 Thereafter a state could no longer be sued
in federal court by the citizens of another state. This was not,
however, a repudiation of the rationale of Chisholm v. Georgia,40
for the states were concerned with finance-not legal theory.
They very simply did not want to be sued for the payment of
state obligations. Although the amendment did not by its terms
apply to suits against the federal government, its indirect effect
was to stay the hands of the court in future cases concerned with
the problem of sovereign immunity.4 '
It was not until 1821 that the court again considered the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, and by that time the change in
judicial personnel and the indirect impact of the Eleventh
Amendment had taken its toll. In Cohens v. Virginia42 Chief
Justice Marshall reaffirmed in dictum the position that he had
taken in debate before the Virginia Convention. The Chief
37. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879).
38. Laski, Responsibility of the State in England, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 447
(1919).
39. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
40. Watkins, op. cit. supra note 2, at 53, 54.
41. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
42. Ibid.
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Justice did not attempt, however, to justify the principle on legal,
logical, or historical grounds, but simply stated in passing:
"The universally received opinion is, that no suit can
be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that
the judiciary act does not authorize such suits. '43
In 1834 Marshall again asserted the non-suability of the federal
government:
"As the United States are not suable of common right,
the party who institutes such suit must bring his case within
the authority of some act of congress, or the court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over it."'44
In 1846, the court denied jurisdiction of a federal court to
enjoin the United States from collecting a judgment previously
rendered in its favor,45 and in the same year it denied the author-
ity of a state court to attach money in the hands of a ship's
purser due as wages to sailors of the famous battleship Consti-
tution.46
In 1850 the court confidently stated:
"No maxim is thought to be better established or more uni-
versally assented to, than that which ordains that a sov-
ereign, or a government representing the sovereign, cannot
ex delicto be amenable to its own creatures or agents em-
ployed under its own authority for the fulfilment merely
of its own legitimate ends. '47
These statements are typical of the opinions rendered prior
to the end of the Civil War.48 Excepting the opinion of Chisholm
43. Id. at 411-412.
44. United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. 436, 443 (1834).
45. United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286, 288 (1846), wherein the Court
said, "There was no jurisdiction of this case in the Circuit Court, as the
government is not liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given by
law. Nor can a decree or judgment be entered against the government for
costs."
46. Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. 20 (1846).
47. Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. 386, 389 (1850).
48. See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272 (1850); Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S.
478 (1854); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857), wherein the Court
stated, "It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations
that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without
its consent and permission; but it may, if it thinks proper, waive this priv-
ilege, and permit itself to be made a defendant in a suit by individuals, or
by another State. And as this permission is altogether voluntary on the part
of the sovereignty, it follows that it may prescribe the terms and conditions
on which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the suit shall be
conducted, and may withdraw its consent whenever it may suppose that
justice to the public requires it."
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v. Georgia (which denied the immunity of the State of Georgia),
no case had ever discussed the justification or desirability of the
application of the concept. In the years following the Civil War,
the court suddenly made an ex post facto consideration of its
adoption of the doctrine, and the rationalizations that resulted
were conflicting and confused-agreeing only in their conclusion
that the federal government is immune from suit, unless it has
given its express consent by congressional act.
In 1865 the highest court of Massachusetts made an exhaus-
tive study of the whole concept.4 9 Justice Gray gave a learned
and scholarly review of the English historical background, and
noted that earlier books had based their conclusion upon the
theory that the king could not by his own writ command him-
self, but then stated what he considered to be the broader reason-
"that it would be inconsistent with the very idea of supreme
executive power, and would endanger the performance of the
public duties of the sovereign, to subject him to repeated suits as
a matter of right, at the will of any citizen, and to submit to
judicial tribunals the control and disposition of his public prop-
erty, his instruments and means of carrying on the government
in war and peace, and the money in his treasury."
Some seventy-five years after the decision of Chisholm v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court attempted a rational justification of
the immunity doctrine. In 1868 and 1869 three cases were decided
which taken together place the justification of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity on the ambiguous phrase "policy imposed
by necessity."
"Every government has an inherent right to protect itself
against suits, and if, in the liberality of legislation, they are
permitted, it is only on such terms and conditions as are
prescribed by statute. The principle is fundamental, applies
to every sovereign power, and but for the protection which it
affords, the government would be unable to perform the
various duties for which it was created. It would be impos-
sible for it to collect revenue for its support, without infinite
embarrassments and delays, if it was subject to civil processes
the same as a private person." Nichols v. United States.50
"It is a familiar doctrine of the common law, that the
sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his con-
49. Briggs v. Light-Boats, 11 Allen 157 (Mass. 1865).
50. 74 U.S. 122, 126 (1868).
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sent. The doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy; the'
inconvenience and danger which would follow from any
different rule. It is obvious that the public service would be
hindered, and the public safety endangered, if the supreme
authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every
citizen, and consequently controlled in the use and dispo-
sition of the means required for the proper administration of
the government. The exemption from direct suit is, therefore,'
without exception." The Siren.51
"No government 52 has ever held itself liable to individuals
for the misfeasance, laches or unauthorized exercise of power
by its officers and agents.
* * *
"The general principle which we have already stated as
applicable to all governments, forbids, on a policy imposed
by necessity, that they should hold themselves liable for
unauthorized wrongs inflicted by their officers on the citizen,
though occurring while engaged in the discharge of official
duties." Gibbons v. United States. 53
This "necessity" justification is comforting only in so far as it
reflects a judicial attempt to analyze the basis of a doctrine that
it had so long ago accepted. The reasoning of the court is not
sound. Other countries have accepted financial responsibility, with
no apparent loss of efficient or effective governmental service.54
Even in this country, congressional acts have by now largely
emasculated the concept of sovereign immunity, and who would
argue that the effective control of our federal government has
diminished! If necessity were in fact the justification, then its
application should be limited to the narrow area of actual need.55
Why is it "necessary" that our government be legally free from
contracts solemnly entered into by it with private citizens? Con-
gress has long ago conceded responsibility in such fields, despite
judicial statements that sovereign immunity is derived from a
"policy imposed by necessity."
51. 74 U.S. 152, 153-154 (1868).
52. Professor Borchard stated that the justice's "horizon was extremely
limited, for he overlooked the fact that practically every country of western
Europe has long admitted such liability." Government Liability in Tort, 34
Yale L.J. 1, 2 (1924).
53. 75 U.S. 269, 275 (1868).
54. See note 52 supra.
55. See Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign
Immunity Doctrine, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060 (1946).
[VOL. XIII
1953] DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 489
Finally in 1879, it was expressly urged upon the court that
the English maxim that the king can do no wrong is applicable
in this country, and the court clearly and affirmatively rejected
the notion.5 6 Pointing out that the President is the only individ-
ual to whom the doctrine could possibly be applicable, the court
noted that the Constitution itself recognized that he could do
wrong and provided for impeachment procedures.
"It is to be observed that the English maxim does not
declare that the government, or those who administer it,
can do no wrong; for it is a part of the principle itself that
wrong may be done by the governing power, for which the
ministry, for the time being, is held responsible; and the
ministers personally, like our President, may be impeached;
or, if the wrong amounts to a crime, they may be indicted
and tried at law for the offence.
"We do not understand that either in reference to the
government of the United States, or of the several States, or
of any of their officers, the English maxim has an existence in
this country. ' '57
Here at long last is a complete judicial refutation of the applica-
bility of English precedent on the issue of the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity. If theoretical justification were to be found,
the court would have to look to other quarters.
. In United States v. Lee 58 the court admitted that the doctrine
had been accepted in this country without discussion. The court
attempted to determine the reasons behind the doctrine, and
upon consideration it rejected in turn each of the prior attempts
at justification, and itself put forward a new explanation. It
rejected as inapplicable the suggestion that this country might
base its acceptance of the doctrine on the hypothesis that in
England the king could not send writs to himself to command
the king to appear in the king's court, for it says that here
process runs in the name of the President, and could be served
on the Attorney General. That it would be degrading for the
government to appear as defendant before the courts of its crea-
tion was likewise rejected, for the government is constantly
appearing before those courts, "and submitting its rights as
against the citizen to their judgment." The reasoning of Justice
56. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879).
57. Id. at 343.
58. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
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Gray in Briggs v. Light-Boats59 was discredited by the majority
opinion, for it noted that "no person in the government exercises
supreme executive power, or performs the duties of a sovereign."
By implication the "necessity" justification was also discarded,
for in the Lee case the court gave this explanation of the doc-
trine's acceptance:
"It seems most probable that it has been adopted in our
courts as a part of the general doctrine of publicists, that the
supreme power in every State, wherever it may reside, shall
not be compelled, by process of courts of its own creation, to
defend itself from assaults in those courts." 60
The court itself did not appear to accept this as a justifica-
tion-but only offered it as an explanation of a course of conduct
previously followed by the court. It states that the people are
sovereign, and seems to have much sympathy with the views
expressed by Mr. Justice Wilson in Chisholm v. Georgia. And the
Lee case reflects a judicial desire to limit the application of the
immunity doctrine.6 1
But the period of restriction was short-lived, for Mr. Justice
Holmes, a strong protagonist, was appointed to the Supreme
Court and took with him fixed ideas of Austinian jurisprudence.
In colorful language he twice defended the doctrine of sovereign
immunity on logical grounds, calling to his aid the wisdom of
Bodin and Hobbes. In Kawananakoa v. Polyblank62 Justice
Holmes stated:
"Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the
immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own
permission, but the answer has been public property since
before the days of Hobbes. (Leviathan, c. 26, 2.) A sovereign
59. 11 Allen 157 (Mass. 1865), discussed supra p. 487.
60. 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882).
61. For another instance of a restrictive attitude towards the immunity
doctrine, see The Bank of The United States v. The Planters Bank of Georgia,
22 U.S. 904 (1824), wherein Chief Justice Marshall held that when a govern-
ment becomes a partner in a trading company, it divests itself of its sovereign
character insofar as the transactions of the company are concerned, and does
not communicate to the company its privileges and prerogatives. (Followed
in Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. 256 [18371.) See also The Davis, 77 U.S.
15 (1869), wherein Justice Miller held that a lien existed against personal
property of the United States for salvage services rendered, even though the
same could not be enforced against the government itself. He reasoned that
since It was in the possession of a carrier under contract with the govern-
ment, It was not actually in the possession of the government, and therefore
process could be carried out against the property.
62. 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
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is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. 'Car on peut bien
recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se
donner loy.' Bodin, Republique, 1, c. 8. Ed. 1629, p. 132. Sir
John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, c. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur
necessitative. Baldus., De Leg. et Const., Digna Vox (2d ed.,
1496, fol. 51b. Ed. 1539, fol. 61)."
And again in The Western Star,63 he wrote:
"The United States has not consented to be sued for
torts, and therefore it cannot be said that in a legal sense the
United States has been guilty of a tort. For a tort is a tort in
a legal sense only because the law has made it so."
Justice Holmes' position has been roundly criticized.6 4 Even
the internal validity of his reasoning has not been immune from
attack, for there appears to be a certain internal inconsistency.
He of course admits that the sovereign is not immune when it has
consented to be sued, but then states confidently what he puts
forth as universal truth-"there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
Justice Holmes of course admits that the sovereign is not
immune from suit when it has consented to be sued. But what is
created when the sovereign so consents? Is not a right thereby
created? Is it not a legal right? If so, whom is it against? Is it
not in fact a "legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends"? Yet Justice Holmes states as
a universal rule that on a "logical" ground, there can be no such
right.
It is further stated that on a "practical" ground, there can be
no such right. Familiar with the protection afforded by the
Tucker Act,65 practical businessmen of today would be amazed
if informed by their attorney that a contract with the government
afforded them no rights.
63. 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
64. See the excellent discussion in Borchard, Governmental Responsibility
in Tort, V, 36 Yale L.J. 757 et seq. (1927), in which an excellent analysis of
the Holmes approach is given, along with generous citation of authorities.
See also Laski, Responsibility of the State in England, 32 Harv. L. Rev.
447, 464 et seq. (1919).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1948).
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But it is not the purpose of this paper to make a philosophical
critique of Holmes or his reasoning. It is, however, important to
note that his conclusions are underpinned by certain basic
assumptions which may or may not be in harmony with what
present day Americans expect (and demand) of their govern-
ment. His discussion assumes as granted an Austinian concept
of law. But it has been well stated that: 66
".. . an Austinian state is incompatible with the substance
of democracy. For the latter implies responsibility by its
very definition; and the Austinian system is, at bottom, sim-
ply a method by which the fallibility of men is concealed
imposingly from the public view."
Justice Holmes has himself provided the eloquent retort to
his "logic" justification of the doctrine of sovereign immunity: 67
other tools are needed besides logic.... The life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience."
What then is the experience of this country? The birth and
growth of America has been a response to a demand for respon-
sible government. As the scope of governmental activity has
increased, Congress has gradually relinquished the government's
claim to irresponsibility. The process has been slow and painful,
and justice has in many instances been denied, but the trend is
undoubtedly towards governmental acceptance of liability for
the risks that its activities create. Today government is nothing
so much as a giant public service corporation, 68 and there is no
valid reason why citizens dealing with this colossus should do so
at their peril, with no right to seek justice from their courts.
Our experience has been that as our country has grown in this
modern industrial society, governmental activities and contacts
have quite naturally increased. The risks of such activity should
not be borne by the citizen who, by chance is injured by govern-
66. Laski, Responsibility of the State in England, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 447,
466 (1919). See also Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, V, 36
Yale L.J. 757, 758-759 (1927), who notes that he was unable to find anyone in
Continental Europe who has "suggested either the axiomatic character of
procedural immunity from suit or its alleged analytical explanation," despite
what Professor Borchard considers to be their "equally profound knowledge
of the political and legal theories of Bodin and Hobbes."
67. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881).
68. Laski, Responsibility of the State in England, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 447,
452 (1919), in which he states "The modern state is, in the American phrase,
nothing so much as a great public-service corporation." He states elsewhere
(p. 451) that "Responsibility on the part of the Crown does not involve its
degradation; it is nothing more than the obvious principle that in a human
society acts involve consequences and consequences involve obligation."
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mental contact. Governmental liability for the risks that it itself
creates is the natural concomitant of a dynamic democratic and
responsive government. More and more often citizens of this
country have hailed their government before judicial tribunals,
and they have collected huge judgments for the infringement of
alleged rights. The long arm of government has not been thereby
crippled or cut off.
Subsequent decisions lack the self-assurance of Mr. Justice
Holmes. The acceptance continues, but the reasons given there-
for are general and uncertain. In 1939 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
stated: 69
"The starting point of inquiry is the immunity from
unconsented suit of the government itself. As to the states,
legal responsibility was written into the Eleventh Amend-
ment; as to the United States, it is derived by implication.
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321. For present purposes
it is academic to consider whether this exceptional freedom
from legal responsibility rests on the theory that the United
States is deemed the institutional descendant of the Crown,
enjoying its immunity but not its historic prerogatives, cf.
Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343, or on a meta-
physical doctrine 'that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.'
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353."
Neither of Justice Frankfurter's suggested justifications is satis-
fying, and neither appears to have the enthusiastic support of
Justice Frankfurter, who characterized his discussion as "aca-
demic." Justice Holmes' "metaphysical" justification has already
been discussed, and even Justice Frankfurter apparently admits
that prior jurisprudence does not sustain his alternative sug-
gestion.
In 1940 the court abandoned any attempt to locate precisely
the origins of the concept, and decided that numerous factors
had contributed to its existence.70
"The reasons for this immunity are imbedded in our
legal philosophy. They partake somewhat of dignity and
decorum, somewhat of practical administration, somewhat of
the political desirability of an impregnable legal citadel
69. Keifer & Keifer v. R.F.C. and Regional Agricultural Credit Corp., 306
U.S. 381, 388 (1939).
70. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940).
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where government as distinct from its functionaries may
operate undisturbed by the demands of litigants. A sense of
justice has brought a progressive relaxation by legislative
enactments of the rigor of the immunity rule. As representa-
tive governments attempt to ameliorate inequalities as neces-
sities will permit, prerogatives of the government yield to the
needs of the citizen.... When authority is given, it is liberally
construed. As to these matters no controversy exists."
Thus the matter rests-a confused, conflicting, but tenacious
acceptance of an outmoded and undemocratic dogma. Perhaps it
is now too late for the court to make a volte face, and completely
reject the doctrine-as historically, theoretically and practically
unsound and undesirable. Nevertheless, corrective legislation is
needed-legislation which would combine and integrate our pres-
ent law, and eliminate the quirks and injustices that must char-
acterize a hodge-podge, sporadic legislative process. Pending
such legislation, the courts should by interpretation give the
widest possible effect to statutes waiving sovereign immunity in
various fields. The evident spirit of these laws should be carried
out. Procedural anachronisms should not be employed to limit the
liberal policy of such statutes. The courts might use as their guide
the phrase inextricably linked with the history of English
attempts to evade the tentacles of the immunity concept-"Let
right be done!"
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